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DENIAL OF A PRO SE LITIGANT'S MOTION
TO APPOINT COUNSEL: THE PRECLUSIVE EFFECT
OF REFUSING IMMEDIATE REVIEW
INTRODUCTION
The federal judiciary, in an attempt to reduce the burden on appel-
late courts, has regularly invoked the final judgment rule.' This rule
limits appeals to those from final decisions of the district courts.2 The
courts, however, have frequently found it difficult to harmonize this
concern with their desire to avoid the hardship resulting from errone-
ous interlocutory orders. 3 The collateral order doctrine, which per-
mits the immediate appeal of a small class of interlocutory orders,
4
represents an attempted resolution of this conflict. 5 The doctrine,
however, has been inconsistently applied.6
The appealability of the denial of an indigent's motion to appoint
counsel pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 19647 or
section 1915(d) of the Judicial Code" is illustrative of the judiciary's
1. See, e.g., Will v. United States, 389 U.S. 90, 96-98 (1967); DiBella v. United
States, 369 U.S. 121, 126-32 (1962); Parr v. United States, 351 U.S. 513, 518-21
(1956); Cobbledick v. United States, 309 US. 323, 324-29 (1940).
2. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Risjord, 449 U.S. 368, 373-74 (1981); United
States v. MacDonald, 435 U.S. 850, 853-56 (1978); United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S.
683, 690-92 (1974); see infra pt. I(A).
3. See Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 170-71 (1974); Gillespie v.
United States Steel Corp., 379 U.S. 148, 152-54 (1964); Dickinson v. Petroleum
Conver. Corp., 338 U.S. 507, 511 (1950); Redish, The Pragmatic Approach to
Appealability in the Federal Courts, 75 Colum. L. Rev. 89, 90-91 (1975). An inter-
locutory order is one rendered during the course of litigation that determines an issue
other than the merits of the cause of action itself. Gas & Elec. Sees. Co. v. Manhattan
& Queens Traction Corp., 266 F. 625, 632 (2d Cir. 1920).
4. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Risjord, 449 U.S. 368, 374-75 (1981); Coop-
ers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 468 (1978); Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan
Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 546-47 (1949); see infra pt. I(B).
5. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 331 n.11 (1976); In re Continental
Inv. Corp., 637 F.2d 1, 7 (1st Cir. 1980); Forsyth v. Kleindienst, 599 F.2d 1203,
1208 (3d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 3147 (1981).
6. Compare In re Continental Inv. Corp., 637 F.2d 1, 4-7 (ist Cir. 1980) (order
denying motion to disqualify counsel not immediately appealable), and Armstrong v.
McAlpin, 625 F.2d 433, 437-40 (2d Cir. 1980) (en banc) (same), vacated and re-
manded with instructions to dismiss appeal, 449 U.S. 1106 (1981), with United States
v. Miller, 624 F.2d 1198, 1199 (3d Cir. 1980) (order denying motion to disqualify
counsel immediately appealable), and Schloetter v. Railoc of Ind., Inc., 546 F.2d
706, 709 (7th Cir. 1976) (same).
7. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1) (1976). Title VII provides for a waiver of court
costs, fees or security and permits the appointment of counsel. Id.
8. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) (1976). Section 1915 also provides for proceeding in
forma pauperis-that is, with the waiver of court costs, fees and security, Marks v.
Calendine, 80 F.R.D. 24, 27-28, 31 (N.D.W. Va. 1978), and appointment of coun-
sel. 28 U.S.C. 99 1915(a), (d) (1976). Although § 1915 applies to both civil and
criminal proceedings, this Note will focus only on civil actions.
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ambivalence. 9 Permitting immediate appeal increases the number of
interlocutory orders on which appellate courts must rule.' 0 Refusing
review, however, thwarts the intent of these two statutes to provide
equal access to the judicial system" because it forces the movant to
proceed without the aid of counsel-that is, pro se. ' 2
A lawsuit, from pre-trial proceedings through trial and ultimately
appeal, is fraught with technical rules of procedure and evidence
which a layman can hardly be expected to know, let alone use to his
advantage.' 3 The procurement, development and presentation of
facts and applicable legal doctrines require the skills of trained coun-
sel.' 4 In short, not only will a pro se litigant have a slim chance of
9. Compare Bradshaw v. Zoological Soc'y, 662 F.2d 1301, 1318 (9th Cir. 1981)
(denial immediately appealable), and Ray v. Robinson, 640 F.2d 474, 476-77 (3d
Cir. 1981) (same), with Randle v. Victor Welding Supply Co., 664 F.2d 1064, 1067
(7th Cir. 1981) (per curiam) (denial not immediately appealable), and Cotner v.
Mason, 657 F.2d 1390, 1391-92 (10th Cir. 1981) (per curiam) (same).
10. See Cobbledick v. United States, 309 U.S. 323, 324-26 (1940); McLish v.
Roff, 141 U.S. 661, 666 (1891).
11. Bradshaw v. Zoological Soc'y, 662 F.2d 1301, 1316-17 & n.40 (9th Cir. 1981)
(Title VII); Hilliard v. Volcker, 659 F.2d 1125, 1128-29 & nn.24-25 (D.C. Cir. 1981)
(same); H.R. Rep. No. 238, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 12, reprinted in 1972 U.S. Code
Cong. & Ad. News 2137, 2148 (same); H.R. Rep. No. 1079, 52d Cong., 1st Sess. 1-2
(1892) (predecessor to § 1915); Duniway, The Poor Man in the Federal Courts, 18
Stan. L. Rev. 1270, 1271-72, 1276-77 (1966) (§ 1915 and its predecessor). As Senator
Javits noted in a debate over the authority of the EEOC to issue cease and desist
orders, "[i]f the complainant is going to have nothing but a remedy in court [under
Title VII], at least let us lock that up in the best way we can." 118 Cong. Rec. 946,
954-55 (1972) (statement of Sen. Javits). The courts have recognized a judicial duty
to assist the pro se litigant. Gordon v. Leeke, 574 F.2d 1147, 1148, 1151 (4th Cir.),
cert. denied, 439 U.S. 970 (1978); Canty v. City of Richmond, 383 F. Supp. 1396,
1399-1400 (E.D. Va. 1974), aff'd mem. sub nom. Canty v. Brown, 526 F.2d 587 (4th
Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1062 (1976). It is well established that a pro se
litigant's pleadings should be liberally construed so as not to defeat a potentially
meritorious claim. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21 (1972) (per curiam).
Although this "duty to 'construe liberally' and perhaps 'to advise' is the court's ....
[t]he duty to 'present' and to 'advocate' is that of the litigant or his attorney." Gordon
v. Leeke, 574 F.2d 1147, 1153 (4th Cir.) (Hall, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 439 U.S.
970 (1978). Therefore, no matter how liberally the court interprets its "duty to
assist," the court cannot forsake its role as impartial adjudicator of disputes and
undertake the role of counsel for the pro se litigant. Id.
12. Zeigler & Hermann, The Invisible Litigant: An Inside View of Pro Se Actions
in the Federal Courts, 47 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 157, 159 (1972).
13. See Hilliard v. Volcker, 659 F.2d 1125, 1127 & nn.9 & 14, 1128-29 & nn.20
& 25 (D.C. Cir. 1981); Zeigler & Hermann, supra note 12, 176-87, 201-05; Note,
The Right to Counsel in Civil Litigation, 66 Colum. L. Rev. 1322, 1331-32 (1966)
[hereinafter cited as Right to Counsel]; Note, The Indigent's Right to Counsel in
Civil Cases, 76 Yale L.J. 545, 545 (1967) [hereinafter cited as Indigent Counsel]; cf.
Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344-45 (1963) (criminal case); Powell v.
Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 68-69 (1932) (same).
14. See Hilliard v. Volcker, 659 F.2d 1125, 1127-29 (D.C. Cir. 1981); Potashnick
v. Port City Constr. Co., 609 F.2d 1101, 1118 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 820
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success on the merits,' 5 but there is also a strong possibility that he will
prejudice himself in a way that cannot be corrected upon appeal from
final judgment. 16
The Third and Ninth Circuits, by permitting immediate appeal
under the collateral order doctrine, attempt to avoid the injustice
arising from an erroneous denial of a motion to appoint counsel.I-, The
Seventh and Tenth Circuits, on the other hand, have stressed the
judicial economy fostered by finality and have forbidden immediate
review.18 This Note contends that, in this instance, the emphasis on
(1980); Zeigler & Hermann, supra note 12, at 181-83; Right to counsel, supra note
13, at 1331; Indigent Counsel, supra note 13, at 548; cJ. Powell v. Alabama, 287
U.S. 45, 69 (1932) (criminal case).
15. Bradshaw v. Zoological Soc'y, 662 F.2d 1301, 1310 (9th Cir. 1981); Randle
v. Victor Welding Supply Co., 664 F.2d 1064, 1068 (7th Cir. 1981) (Swygert, J.,
dissenting); Caston v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 556 F.2d 1305, 1308 (5th Cir. 1977);
see Hilliard v. Volcker, 659 F.2d 1125, 1127-29 & n.24 (D.C. Cir. 1981); Zeigler &
Hermann, supra note 12, at 201 & n. 190. In 1980, 168,789 civil suits were filed in the
United States district courts. Director of the Admin. Office of the U.S. Courts,
Annual Report of the Director of the Administrative Office of the United States
Courts table 20, at 231 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Annual Report, with parentheti-
cal indication of year of report]. Although pro se applications were not separately
designated in the Annual Report, civil actions are broken down into general catego-
ries, such as prisoner actions and contractual disputes. Out of these 168,789 suits,
23,287, approximately 14%, were filed by prisoners. Id. Because almost all pro se
applications are brought by prisoners and, conversely, almost all prisoner actions are
brought pro se, the statistics are a close approximation of the actual percentage of pro
se actions. Zeigler & Hermann, supra note 12, at 169 n.42. Moreover, according to a
former pro se clerk for the United States District Court for the Southern District of
New York, in the five-year period from 1966 to 1971, only one pro se plaintiff out of
200 was able to obtain final relief. Id. at 201 & n.190.
16. See Bradshaw v. Zoological Soc'y, 662 F.2d 1301, 1310-14 (9th Cir. 1981);
Randle v. Victor Welding Supply Co., 664 F.2d 1064, 1068 (7th Cir. 1981) (Swvygert,
J., dissenting); Hudak v. Curators of the Univ. of Mo., 586 F.2d 105, 106 (8th Cir.
1978) (per curiam), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 985 (1979); cf. United States v. Deutsch,
599 F.2d 46, 48 (5th Cir.) ("substantial possibility" that some defendants, without
counsel, would prejudice themselves), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 935 (1979).
17. Bradshaw v. Zoological Soc'y, 662 F.2d 1301, 1305, 1319 (9th Cir. 1981);
Ray v. Robinson, 640 F.2d 474, 476-77 (3d Cir. 1981). A number of other courts have
also found the order to be immediately appealable but have done so with little or no
discussion. See, e.g., Hudak v. Curators of the Univ. of Mo., 586 F.2d 105, 106 (8th
Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 985 (1978); Caston v. Sears, Roebuck &
Co., 556 F.2d 1305, 1308 (5th Cir. 1977); Spanos v. Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 470
F.2d 806, 807-08, n.3 (3d Cir. 1972) (per curiarn); Miller v. Pleasure, 296 F.2d 283,
284 (2d Cir. 1961) (per curiam), cert. denied, 370 U.S. 964 (1962); cf. United States
v. Deutsch, 599 F.2d 46, 48 (5th Cir.) (same under Criminal Justice Act, 18 U.S.C. §
3006A (1976)), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 935 (1979); Rincon Band of Mission Indians v.
Escondido Mut. Water Co., 459 F.2d 1082, 1083-84 (9th Cir. 1972) (same under 25
U.S.C. § 175 (1976)).
18. Randle v. Victor Welding Supply Co., 664 F.2d 1064, 1065-67 (7th Cir.
1981) (per curiam); Cotner v. Mason, 657 F.2d 1390, 1391-92 (10th Cir. 1981) (per
curiam).
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finality is misplaced. In every confrontation between the final judg-
ment rule and the collateral order doctrine two important factors
must be taken into consideration: the nature of the proceeding and the
availability of alternative methods of review. The denial of a motion
to appoint counsel, when evaluated in this context, should be immedi-
ately appealable pursuant to the collateral order doctrine.
I. FEDERAL APPELLATE JURISDICTiON
A. The Final Judgment Rule
The final judgment rule, presently codified in section 1291 of the
Judicial Code, 9 is the cornerstone of federal appellate procedure. 20
By providing that appeals may only be taken from final decisions of
the district court, 2' the rule embodies the traditional federal policy
against piecemeal review. 22 The central concern of the finality re-
19. 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1976); see United States v. MacDonald, 435 U.S. 850, 853
(1978); Abney v. United States, 431 U.S. 651, 656 (1977); Mathews v. Eldridge, 424
U.S. 319, 331 n.11 (1976). Section 1291 is directly descended from the First Judiciary
Act of 1789. Act of September 24, 1789, ch. 20, §§ 21, 22, 25, 1 stat. 73, 76, 79, 81
(1789). For a discussion of the historical development of the final judgment rule, see
Crick, The Final Judgment as a Basis for Appeal, 41 Yale L.J. 539 (1939).
20. Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 306 (1962); 9 J. Moore,
Moore's Federal Practice 110.06, at 105-07 (2d ed. 1980); Comment, The Appeala-
bility of Orders Denying Motions for Disqualification of Counsel in the Federal
Courts, 45 U. Chi. L. Rev. 450, 452 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Appealability]; see
Abney v. United States, 431 U.S. 651, 656-57 (1977); DiBella v. United States, 369
U.S. 121, 124-26 (1962); Radio Station WOW, Inc. v. Johnson, 326 U.S. 120, 123-24
(1945); Cobbledick v. United States, 309 U.S. 323, 324-26 (1940); Heike v. United
States, 217 U.S. 423, 428-29 (1910). For a general discussion of the final judgment
rule, see Crick, supra note 19; Redish, supra note 3; Note, The Final Judgment Rule
In The Federal Courts, 47 Colum. L. Rev. 239 (1947); Note, Appealability In The
Federal Courts, 75 Harv. L. Rev. 351 (1961) [hereinafter cited as Federal Courts].
21. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Risjord, 449 U.S. 368, 373-74 (1981); Brown
Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 306 (1962); Cobbledick v. United States,
309 U.S. 323, 324-26 (1940); see 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1976). The right of appeal is
limited to that which is expressely conferred by statute and the judicial constructions
and exceptions thereto; there is no constitutional right of appeal. Abney v. United
States, 431 U.S. 651, 656 (1977); see Carroll v. United States, 354 U.S. 394, 399
(1957); Heike v. United States, 217 U.S. 423, 428-29 (1910); 9 J. Moore, supra note
20, 110.01, at 47.
22. See United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 690 (1974); DiBella v. United
States, 369 U.S. 121, 124 (1962); Catlin v. United States, 324 U.S. 229, 233-34
(1945); Cobbledick v. United States, 309 U.S. 323, 324-26 (1940). This principle also
extends to Supreme Court review of state court decisions. 28 U.S.C. § 1257 (1976);
see, e.g., Local No. 438 Constr. & Gen. Laborers' Union v. Curry, 371 U.S. 542,
548-50 (1963); Mercantile Nat'l Bank v. Langdeau, 371 U.S. 555, 557-58 (1963);
Radio Station WOW, Inc. v. Johnson, 326 U.S. 120, 124 (1945); cf. FTC v. Standard
Oil Co., 449 U.S. 232, 238 (1980) (FTC action subject to judicial review only if it
"was 'final agency action' ").
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quirement is to ensure a speedy, efficient and economical judicial
system. 23
At the district court level, the rule eliminates repeated interruptions
of the trial and reduces the waste of time and the delay in the ultimate
resolution of the case which piecemeal review would cause.2 ' At the
appellate level, consolidating all issues in a single appeal limits the
number of arguments, briefs and records presented and reviewed in
each case.2 5  Moreover, avoiding immediate appellate review of a
disputed issue may render appellate review unnecessary if the ag-
grieved party ultimately prevails on the merits, or if the district court
later corrects its own error.2 6
The policy against piecemeal review also prevents the use of inter-
locutory appeals solely for purposes of harassment and delay.27 Per-
23. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Risjord, 449 U.S. 368, 374 (1981); United
States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 690 (1974); Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S.
294, 306 (1962); DiBella v. United States, 369 U.S. 121, 124 (1962). Justice Frank-
furter noted that finality "has the support of considerations generally applicable to
good judicial administration. It avoids the mischief of economic waste and of delayed
justice." Radio Station WOW, Inc. v. Johnson, 326 U.S. 120, 124 (1945). The
amount of litigation in the federal courts has been increasing steadily each year. The
total number of complaints filed in all federal district courts in 1960 was 57,665.
Annual Report (1960), supra note 15, at 74. In 1970, the total was 87,321. Annual
Report (1970), supra note 15, table 12, at 107. The total in 1980 was 16S,789. Annual
Report (1980), supra note 15, table 13, at 217. The total number of federal appeals
has increased correspondingly. In 1960, 3,899 appeals were filed. Annual Report
(1960), supra note 15, at 68. In 1970, the total was 11,662. Annual Report (1970),
supra note 15, table 2, at 96. Finally, in 1980, 23,200 appeals were filed. Annual
Report (1980), supra note 15, table 1, at 198.
24. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 690 (1974); DiBella v. United States,
369 U.S. 121, 124 (1962); Baltimore Contractors, Inc. v. Bodinger, 348 U.S. 176, 178
(1955); Redish, supra note 3, at 89; Federal Courts, supra note 20, at 351.
25. Federal Courts, supra note 20, at 352.
26. Appealability, supra note 20, at 452; see Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437
U.S. 463, 468 (1978); United States v. MacDonald, 435 U.S. 850, 858-59 (1978);
Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 309 (1962); Cohen v. Beneficial
Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 546 (1949); Redish, supra note 3, at 89; Federal
Courts, supra note 20, at 352. Conditioning appeals on finality may promote better
informed decisions at both the trial and appellate court level. Appealability, supra
note 20, at 452; Federal Courts, supra note 20, at 352. The district court may act in a
more deliberate and considered manner because erroneous interlocutory orders
which do not constitute reversible error will never be corrected, 15 C. Wright, A.
Miller & E. Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure: Jurisdiction § 3907, at 431
(1976) [hereinafter cited as C. Wright & A. Miller]; Federal Courts, supra note 20, at
352, while erroneous interlocutory orders requiring reversal will necessitate a new
trial. Id. A consolidated review after final judgment will also enable the appellate
court to assess each allegedly erroneous interlocutory order with a broader perspec-
tive. Id.
27. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Risjord, 449 U.S. 368, 374 (1981); United
States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 690 (1974); DiBella v. United States, 369 U.S. 121, 129
(1962); Cobbledick v. United States, 309 U.S. 323, 325 (1940).
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mitting unrestricted interlocutory appeals would allow a litigant to
employ the appellate process to deplete his adversary's financial re-
sources and thereby force a premature settlement of the litigation.28
Furthermore, the final judgment rule stresses the deference that ap-
pellate courts owe to district courts as the forum "initially called upon
to decide the many questions of law and fact that occur in the course
of a trial. ' '29  Repeated intervention in trial court proceedings
through interlocutory appeals could "undermine the independence" of
and respect for the trial judge and, thereby, his ability to control the
proceeding.30
B. The Collateral Order Doctrine
While the benefits of the finality rule are numerous, 3' its rigid and
inflexible application could result in severe hardship. 32  To mitigate
this harshness, the Supreme Court has fashioned a number of excep-
tions. 33 The most important of these is the collateral order doctrine.
28, 15 C. Wright & A. Miller, supra note 26, § 3907, at 432.
29. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Risjord, 449 U.S. 368, 374 (1981); Peter Pan
Fabrics, Inc. v. Dixon Textile Corp., 280 F.2d 800, 805-06 (2d Cir. 1960) (Clark, J.,
dissenting).
30. See Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Risjord, 449 U.S. 368, 374 (1981); 15 C.
Wright & A. Miller, supra note 26, § 3907, at 430-32; cf. Cohen v. Beneficial Indus.
Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 546 (1949) (appellate court has power of review, not
intervention).
31. See supra notes 22-30 and accompanying text.
32. Redish, supra note 3, at 90; Comment, Collateral Orders and Extraordinary
Writs as Exceptions to the Finality Rule, 51 Nw. U. L. Rev. 746, 746 (1957)
[hereinafter cited as Collateral Orders]; Appealability, supra note 20, at 452; Federal
Courts, supra note 20, at 352. For example, although an order denying a motion to
dismiss a subpoena duces tecum may force the disclosure of privileged information,
review is generally available only upon final judgment. E.g., United States v. Ryan,
402 U.S. 530, 532-33 (1971); Cobbledick v. United States, 309 U.S. 323, 324-28
(1940). The subpoenaed party may obtain immediate review if he refuses to comply
with the subpeona and submits himself to contempt. United States v. Ryan, 402 U.S.
530, 532 (1971); Cobblestick v. United States, 309 U.S. 323, 327-28 (1940); see
Collateral Orders, supra, at 751 n.21. The latter alternative, however, imposes
severe hardship on the subpoenaed party. To avoid such hardship, the Court, in
similar instances, has applied the finality requirement pragmatically. See, e.g., Eisen
v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 170-71 (1974); Gillespie v. United States Steel
Corp., 379 U.S. 148, 152-54 (1964); Dickinson v. Petroleum Conver. Corp., 338 U.S.
507, 511 (1950). This "inquiry requires some evaluation of the competing consider-
ations underlying all questions of finality-'the inconvenience and costs of piecemeal
review on the one hand and the danger of denying justice by delay on the other.' "
Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 171 (1974) (quoting Dickinson v.
Petroleum Conver. Corp., 338 U.S. 507, 511 (1950) (footnote omitted)).
33. 9 J. Moore, supra note 20, § 110.08, at 111-13. There are also a number of
statutory means for obtaining appellate review prior to final judgment. The All Writs
Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651 (1976), provides for the review of interlocutory orders by way
of a writ of mandamus. The Interlocutory Appeals Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (1976),
allows the appeal, upon certification by the district and appellate court, of interlocu-
tory orders satisfying specified criteria. These two statutes offer little assistance when
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This doctrine, which allows the immediate appeal of interlocutory
orders that satisfy specified criteria, 34 was first enunciated in Cohen v.
Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp.35 In Cohen, the Third Circuit had
permitted an immediate appeal from the district court's denial of a
motion to require the plaintiff to furnish security pursuant to a state
statute.36 Upon review, the Supreme Court addressed the question of
whether the circuit court had acted properly in accepting the ap-
peal.3 7  In finding the denial immediately appealable, the Court
recognized that Congress had not intended to restrict review to those
decisions that terminated an action. 38  Because there was no assur-
ance that the defendant, if successful, could recover his costs, 9 the
Court concluded that appellate review of the denial did not frustrate
the final judgment rule.4 °
immediate appeal of a denial of a motion to appoint counsel is sought. See infra notes
136-45 and accompanying text. The two other provisions, 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)
(1976), which allows appeals of a number of orders, most notably injunctions, id. §
1292(a)(1), and rule 54(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which permits
appeals of final orders in multi-party or multi-claim litigation, are inapplicable. The
two judicially carved exceptions to the final judgment rule stem from the landmark
cases of Forgay v. Conrad, 47 U.S. 201, 6 How. 212 (1848), and Cohen v. Beneficial
Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541 (1949). In Forgay, the Court allowed an immediate
appeal, as of right, of an order directing the immediate transfer of title to property
prior to an accounting. 47 U.S. at 202-04, 6 How. at 214-16. Chief Judge Taney
reasoned that the substantive issues in the case had been finally determined and that
irreparable injury could result if appeal was delayed until the final accounting. Id. at
204, 6 How. at 216. Although the Forgay rationale is relevant, an exception relating
solely to transfer of title is, by definition, irrelevant to the appealability of an order
refusing to appoint counsel.
34. See Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 546-47 (1949).
35. 337 U.S. 541 (1949). Although some courts have treated the collateral order
doctrine as an interpretation of the final judgment rule, e.g., United States v.
Gurney, 558 F.2d 1202, 1207 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 96S (1978);
Tomlinson v. Poller, 220 F.2d 308, 310-11 (5th Cir. 1955), the better approach is to
treat it as a judicially carved exception, see Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Risjord,
449 U.S. 368, 374 (1981); United States. v. MacDonald, 435 U.S. 850, 854 (1978),
because "it serves to permit appeal of admittedly interlocutory orders." Redish, supra
note 3, at 111 n.120.
36. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp. v. Smith, 170 F.2d 44, 49-50 (3d Cir. 1948),
aff'd sub nom. Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541 (1949). In so
doing the Third Circuit applied a practical approach in assessing the finality of the
decision.
37. 337 U.S. at 545-47.
38. Id. at 545.
39. Collateral Orders, supra note 32, at 750 n. 18; see Federal Courts, supra note
20, at 364.
40. Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 545-46 (1949); accord
Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 468 (1978). The Court noted that it
was continuing a tradition of giving finality a "'practical rather than a technical
construction." 337 U.S. at 546; accord Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Risjord, 449
U.S. 368, 375 (1981). However, a practical approach, which exclusively emphasizes
the effective termination of the litigation, would not always comport with the
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Four prerequisites for appeal under the collateral order doctrine
can be distilled from the Cohen opinion. First, the order must conclu-
sively determine the disputed question.41 Permitting appeal of incon-
clusive orders would necessarily involve the appellate court in trial
court matters in contravention of one of the purposes of the final
judgment rule.42  Second, the right asserted in the order must be
collateral to and separable from the merits of the underlying cause of
action. 43  Immediate appeal of non-collateral orders could lead to
repetitive and unnecessary reviews of the merits. 41
collateral order doctrine, Appealability, supra note 20, at 454 n.17; see, e.g., Stack v.
Boyle, 342 U.S. 1, 6-7 (1951) (denial of motion to reduce bail within collateral order
doctrine); Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 545-47 (1949) (same
with respect to denial of motion requiring plaintiff to furnish security), because the
exception is intended to avoid the "legal and practical" loss of an asserted right prior
to termination. United States v. MacDonald, 435 U.S. 850, 860 (1978).
41. Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 546 (1949); accord
Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 468 (1978); United States v. Mac-
Donald, 435 U.S. 850, 854-55, 858 (1978); Abney v. United States, 431 U.S. 651,
658-59 (1977). For example, an order denying a motion to dismiss an indictment on
speedy trial grounds would not constitute a final rejection of the claim by the trial
court because it necessarily involves an assessment of the facts of the case after trial.
United States v. MacDonald, 435 U.S. 850, 858 (1978).
42. 337 U.S. at 546, see supra notes 29-30 and accompanying text. This is the
simplest criterion and courts have had little trouble applying it. 15 C. Wright &
A. Miller, supra note 26. § 3911, at 478-79; see, e.g., Citibank, N.A. v. Fullam, 580
F.2d 82, 89 (3d Cir. 1978); Western Elec. Co. v. Milgo Elec. Corp., 568 F.2d 1203,
1207 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 895 (1978); Rodgers v. United States Steel
Corp., 541 F.2d 365 (3d Cir. 1976).
43. Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 546 (1949); accord
Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 468 (1978); United States v. Mac-
Donald, 435 U.S. 850, 855, 859 (1978). The Cohen Court's initial description of a
collateral order as one that will not "affect, or ... be affected by, [a] decision of the
merits" of the case, 337 U.S. at 546, although helpful, is somewhat misleading. All
orders may be affected by a decision on the merits because the decision may render
the order moot. Redish, supra note 3, at 112; Collateral Orders, supra note 32, at
749. In its subsequent discussion, the Court clarified this ambiguity by stating that a
collateral order is one which embodies an issue that "is not an ingredient of the cause
of action and does not require consideration with it." 337 U.S. at 546-47. To
illustrate, an order denying a motion to dismiss an indictment on double jeopardy
grounds is collateral because it does not enmesh the court in the merits of the
underlying criminal charge, and is totally independent of the defendant's guilt or
innocence. Abney v. United States, 431 U.S. 651, 659-60 (1977). An order denying
class certification pursuant to rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
however, is not collateral because it requires the court to assess the "typicality of the
representative's claims or defenses, the adequacy of the representative, and the
presence of common questions of law or fact." 15 C. Wright & A. Miller, supra note
26, § 3911, at 485 n.45; see Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 469 (1978).
44. 15 C. Wright & A. Miller, supra note 26, § 3911, at 470-71; see Federal
Courts, supra note 20, at 352. Some commentators have suggested that the real
function of the separability criterion is to arbitrarily limit the number of appealable
1406 [Vol. 50
1982] DENIAL OF A MOTION TO APPOINT COUNSEL 1407
Third, appellate review after final judgment must be ineffective in
that, by then, the asserted right may be irreparably lost. 45  In this
respect, an essential distinction must be drawn between personal
inconvenience and irreparable harm. When the denial results merely
in prejudice that can be corrected by a new trial, only personal
inconvenience is deemed to exist.46 In such a case, the aggrieved
litigant can proceed to final judgment, appeal and obtain reversal and
a new trial. 47  Although costly and time-consuming, this procedure
provides an adequate remedy. 48 If, however, review after final judg-
ment is an "empty rite' 49 in that the appellate court is powerless to
correct the effect of the order, immediate appeal is justified. 50
interlocutory orders. Redish, supra note 3, at 112 & n. 123; Collateral Orders, supra
note 32, at 757; see Federal Courts, supra note 20, at 365. Therefore, they argue for a
more flexible balancing of the cost and inconvenience of piecemeal review against the
danger of denying justice by delaying appeal until a final judgment. Redish, supra
note 3, at 90-92; Collateral Orders, supra note 32, at 758-60; Federal Courts, supra
note 20, at 367.
45. Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 546 (1949); accord
United States v. MacDonald, 435 U.S. 850, 855, 860 (1978); Abney v. United States,
431 U.S. 651, 658 (1977). The collateral order doctrine's underlying intent is to
provide a means for avoiding such a loss. Forsyth v. Kleindienst, 599 F.2d 1203, 1208
(3d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 3147 (1981); see Mathews v. Eldridge, 424
U.S. 319, 331 n.11 (1976); Federal Courts, supra note 20, at 364.
46. See Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Risjord, 449 U.S. 368, 377-78 (1981);
United States v. MacDonald, 435 U.S. 850, 860 n.7 (1978); Abney v. United States,
431 U.S. 651, 663 (1977); Collateral Orders, supra note 32, at 750; Appealability,
supra note 20, at 456-57.
47. Parr v. United States, 351 U.S. 513, 519-20 (1956); Roche v. Evaporated
Milk Ass'n, 319 U.S. 21, 30 (1943); Cobbledick v. United States, 309 U.S. 323, 325
(1940); see Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Risjord, 449 U.S. 368, 378 (1981); Abney
v. United States, 431 U.S. 651, 663 (1977); Collateral Orders, supra note 32, at 750;
Appealability, supra note 20, at 456-57.
48. See Parr v. United States, 351 U.S. 513, 519-20 (1956); Roche v. Evaporated
Milk Ass'n, 319 U.S. 21, 30 (1943); Cobbledick v. United States, 309 U.S. 323, 325
(1940); Collateral Orders, supra note 32, at 750; Appealability, supra note 20, at
456-57.
49. Swift & Co. Packers v. Compania Colombiana Del Caribe, S.A., 339 U.S.
684, 689 (1950); accord Abney v. United States, 431 U.S. 651, 660-62 (1977); Cohen
v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 546 (1949).
50. See Abney v. United States, 431 U.S. 651, 660-62 (1977); Stack v. Boyle, 342
U.S. 1, 12 (1951) (Jackson, J., concurring); Swift & Co. Packers v. Compania
Colombiana Del Caribe, S.A., 339 U.S. 684, 689 (1950). Although the Cohen court
did not explicitly state that the basis for its decision was the need for immediate
appeal to avoid irreparable harm, this urgency is the focus of the doctrine. In re
Continental Inv. Corp., 637 F.2d 1, 6-7 (lst Cir. 1980); see Armstrong v. MeAlpin,
625 F.2d 433, 439 n.11 (2d Cir. 1980) (en banc), vacated and remanded with
instructions to dismiss appeal, 449 U.S. 1106 (1981); Forsyth v. Kleindienst, 599 F.2d
1203, 1208 (3d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 3147 (1981).
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Fourth, the order must present a "serious and unsettled question" 5'
that is "too important to be denied [immediate] review. 5 2  This
requirement has been interpreted to mean that the question must be
one of law which goes to the district court's power to render the
interlocutory order.5 3 In the most recent applications of Cohen, the
Supreme Court has abandoned the serious and unsettled question
criterion. 54 Instead, it has applied the first three criteria, 5 emphasiz-
ing the personal importance of the order and the right it embodies.50
This resultant three-pronged approach is preferable because a seri-
ous and unsettled question requirement severely restricts the applica-
51. Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 547 (1949); accord
Appealability, supra note 20, 455 & n.22.
52. Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 546 (1949); accord 9 J.
Moore, supra note 20, 110.10, at 133; 15 C. Wright & A. Miller, supra note 26, §
3911, at 471; Appealability, supra note 20, at 455 & n.22; cf. Stack v. Boyle, 342
U.S. 1, 13 (1951) (Jackson, J., concurring) (Supreme Court only grants certiorari if
case represents a general and important problem). The issue presented must be one of
public importance extending beyond the scope of the particular litigants. 9 J. Moore,
supra note 20, 110.10, at 133; Appealability, supra note 20, at 455 n.22; see Donlon
Indus., Inc. v. Forte, 402 F.2d 935, 937 (2d Cir. 1968).
53. Donlon Indus., Inc. v. Forte, 402 F.2d 935, 936 (2d Cir. 1968); 9 J. Moore,
supra note 20, 110.10, at 133; 15 C. Wright & A. Miller, supra note 26, § 3911, at
471.
54. See, e.g., Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Risjord, 449 U.S. 368, 375 (1981);
United States v. MacDonald, 435 U.S. 850, 855, 860 (1978); Abney v. United States,
431 U.S. 651, 663 (1977). The federal courts of appeals disagree on the vitality of the
serious and unsettled question criterion. Compare United States v. Greger, 657 F.2d
1109, 1110 (9th Cir. 1981) (not required), and Armstrong v. McAlpin, 625 F.2d 433,
448 (2d Cir. 1980) (en banc) (Mulligan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(same), vacated and remanded with instructions to dismiss appeal, 449 U.S. 1106
(1981), with In re Continental Inv. Corp., 637 F.2d 1, 4-5 (1st Cir. 1980) (required),
and Armstrong v. McAlpin, 625 F.2d 433, 439-40 (2d Cir. 1980) (en banc) (same),
vacated and remanded with instructions to dismiss appeal, 449 U.S. 1106 (1981).
55. See, e.g., Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Risjord, 449 U.S. 368, 375-78
(1981); Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 468-69 (1978); United States v.
MacDonald, 435 U.S. 850, 855-61 (1978); Abney v. United States, 431 U.S. 651, 658-
63 (1977).
56. See, e.g., Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Risjord, 449 U.S. 368, 377 (1981);
United States v. MacDonald, 435 U.S. 850, 855, 860 (1977); Abney v. United States,
431 U.S. 651, 658 (1977); cf. Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1, 4 (1951) (loss of freedom
prior to trial threatened); Roberts v. United States Dist. Court, 339 U.S. 844 (1950)
(possible loss of right of equal access to the courts); Flowers v. Turbine Support Div.,
507 F.2d 1242, 1244 (5th Cir. 1975) (same). Prior to these decisions, the Supreme
Court had inconsistently applied the Cohen criteria. Compare Roberts v. United
States Dist. Court, 339 U.S. 844, 845 (1950) (ignoring criteria), with Eisen v. Carlisle
& Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 172 (1974) (applying first two prongs), and Swift & Co.
Packers v. Compania Colombiana Del Caribe, S.A., 339 U.S. 684, 689 (1950)
(applying second and third prongs).
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bility of the collateral order doctrine.5 For example, an order that is
discretionary in nature usually hinges on an evaluation of the facts
and policy considerations of each case and rarely presents a serious
and unsettled question. 8 Although a requirement that limits the
number of appeals is not totally undesirable,59 the concern for judicial
economy should assume a secondary role if an important right is
threatened. 60 The collateral order doctrine is explicitly grounded on
preventing the loss of important rights"' and should not be formulated
in a way that would defeat this purpose. -62
57. 9 J. Moore, supra note 20, 110.10, at 136; 15 C. Wright & A. Miller, supra
note 26, § 3911, at 471; see Weight Watchers of Phil., Inc. v. Weight Watchers Int'l,
Inc., 455 F.2d 770, 773 (2d Cir. 1972); Appealability, supra note 20, at 461.
58. See Appealability, supra note 20, at 455 n.22. Such an evaluation may also
run afoul of the separability requirement. See supra notes 43-44 and accompanying
text.
59. See Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 547 (1949) (appli-
cability of state statute requiring security presents serious and unsettled question,
whereas a dispute over the amount of security required does not). But see Donlon
Indus., Inc. v. Forte, 402 F.2d 935, 937 (2d Cir. 1965) (ruling on motion to require
security discretionary and not appealable).
60. See Armstrong v. McAlpin, 625 F.2d 433, 439 n.l1 (2d Cir. 1980) (en banc),
vacated and remanded with instructions to dismiss appeal, 449 U.S. 1106 (1981); 15
C. Wright & A. Miller, supra note 26, § 3911, at 500; Note, Appealability of Orders
Denying Attorney Disqualification Motions in Armstrong v. McAlpin, 1981 Det.
C.L. Rev. 151, 165. Moreover, one of the main purposes of the serious and unsettled
question of law requirement was to "settle a point once and for all." Weight Watch-
ers of Phil., Inc. v. Weight Watchers Int'l, Inc., 455 F.2d 770, 773 (2d Cir. 1972).
The Interlocutory Appeals Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (1976), however, accomplishes
this purpose, by providing for immediate appeal of controlling questions of law. See
In re Continental Inv. Corp., 637 F.2d 1, 7 (1st Cir. 1980). Therefore, there is no
real need for this requirement today.
61. In re Continental Inv. Corp., 637 F.2d 1, 6-7 (1st Cir. 1980); see Armstrong
v. McAlpin, 625 F.2d 433, 439 n.11 (2d Cir. 1980) (en banc), vacated and remanded
with instructions to dismiss appeal, 449 U.S. 1106 (1981); Forsyth v. Kleindienst, 599
F.2d 1203, 1208 (3d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 3147 (1981).
62. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 331 n.11 (1976); In re Continental
Inv. Corp., 637 F.2d 1, 7 (1st Cir. 1980); Forsyth v. Kleindienst, 599 F.2d 1203,
1208 (3d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 3147 (1981). The Second Circuit, while
requiring the presence of a serious and unsettled question, has acknowledged that
immediate appeal from orders involving factual issues has been granted where the
loss of an important right was threatened. Armstrong v. McAlpin, 625 F.2d 433, 439
n.11 (2d Cir. 1980) (en banc), vacated and remanded with instructions to dismiss
appeal, 449 U.S. 1106 (1981); accord In re Continental Inv. Corp., 637 F.2d 1, 7 (1st
Cir. 1980); 9 J. Moore, supra note 20, 110.10, at 133-34. Where the loss of an
important right is not threatened, however, the Cohen criteria are not satisfied
regardless of the existence of a serious and unsettled question. See Firestone Tire &
Rubber Co. v. Risjord, 449 U.S. 368, 375-78 (1981).
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II. APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL AND THE
COLLATERAL ORDER DOCTRINE
Two strong federal policies conflict when a motion seeking the
appointment of counsel is denied and immediate review is sought. The
denial of immediate review serves the historical policy against piece-
meal review,6 3 while permitting the appeal furthers the court's desire
to prevent the imposition of unnecessary hardship on the appellant.04
In Bradshaw v. Zoological Society 5 and Ray v. Robinson,6 the Ninth
and Third Circuits, respectively, resolved this conflict in favor of
immediate review, 67 recognizing that, as a practical matter, the litiga-
tion would be terminated upon the denial and that delayed review is
inherently prejudicial.66 In Randle v. Victor Welding Supply Co.09
and Cotner v. Mason,70 on the other hand, the Seventh and Tenth
Circuits stressed the concern for judicial economy and, consequently,
denied review. 71
63. See supra notes 22-23 and accompanying text.
64. See supra notes 59-62 and accompanying text.
65. 662 F.2d 1301 (9th Cir. 1981).
66. 640 F.2d 474 (3d Cir. 1981).
67. Bradshaw v. Zoological Soc'y, 662 F.2d 1301, 1320 (9th Cir. 1981); Ray v.
Robinson, 640 F.2d 474, 477 (3d Cir. 1981). Other courts have also allowed the
appeal, but with little, if any, discussion. See, e.g., Hudak v. Curators of the Univ.
of Mo., 586 F.2d 105, 106 (8th Cir. 1978) (per curiam), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 985
(1979); Caston v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 556 F.2d 1305, 1308 (5th Cir. 1977); Spanos
v. Penn. Cent. Transp. Co., 470 F.2d 806, 807 n.3 (3d Cir. 1972) (per curiam);
Miller v. Pleasure, 296 F.2d 283, 284 (2d Cir. 1961) (per curiam), cert. denied, 370
U.S. 964 (1962).
68. Bradshaw v. Zoological Soc'y, 662 F.2d 1301, 1310-14 (9th Cir. 1981); see
Ray v. Robinson, 640 F.2d 474, 476-77 (3d Cir. 1981).
69. 664 F.2d 1064 (7th Cir. 1981) (per curiam).
70. 657 F.2d 1390 (10th Cir. 1981) (per curiam).
71. See Randle v. Victor Welding Supply Co., 664 F.2d 1064, 1065-67 (7th Cir.
1981) (per curiam); Cotner v. Mason, 657 F.2d 1390, 1391-92 (10th Cir. 1981) (per
curiam). Both courts based their decisions on the assumption that an order refusing to
appoint counsel "does not end the litigation on the merits." Randle v. Victor Welding
Supply Co., 664 F.2d 1064, 1065 (7th Cir. 1981) (per curiam); accord Cotner v.
Mason, 657 F.2d 1390, 1391 (10th Cir. 1981) (per curiam). Instead, they assumed
that the pro se litigant is capable of presenting his claim and appealing any adverse
final judgment. Randle v. Victor Welding Supply Co., 664 F.2d 1064, 1065 (7th Cir.
1981) (per curiam); Cotner v. Mason, 657 F.2d 1390, 1391 (10th Cir. 1981) (per
curiam). Although the appointment of counsel is authorized under two different
statutes, 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) (1976) and 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1) (1976), the same
appealability analysis is applicable because the same right to counsel and the corre-
sponding right of equal access to the courts is protected by both statutes. See supra
notes 7-8, 11 and accompanying text. Moreover, both statutes utilize basically the
same test in determining whether appointment is warranted. See infra notes 81, 85.
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A. Separability
A number of courts have had little difficulty finding the denial of a
motion to appoint counsel separable from the merits of the underlying
cause of action. 72  The dissenting opinion in Bradshaw, however,
contended that review of the denial would force the appellate court to
become enmeshed in the factual and legal issues of the claim; 73 the
order, therefore, was not collateral to the underlying claim.74 This
conclusion, however, is erroneous. As the majority in Bradshaw
pointed out, there are instances in which the appellate court becomes
minimally involved in the merits of the case, yet the order remains
collateral within the meaning of the Cohen exception.75
For example, in Stack v. Boyle,76 the Court stated that an immedi-
ate appeal of an order refusing to reduce bail was proper. 77  Such
orders require a court to consider the "nature and circumstances of the
offense charged 7 7 as well as "the weight of the evidence against the
accused."' 79 Despite this determination involving the merits, Justice
72. See, e.g., Cotner v. Mason, 657 F.2d 1390, 1391 (10th Cir. 1981) (per
curiam); Ray v. Robinson, 640 F.2d 474, 476-77 (3d Cir. 1981); Caston v. Sears,
Roebuck & Co., 556 F.2d 1305, 1308 (5th Cir. 1977), Spanos v. Penn. Cent. Transp.
Co., 470 F.2d 806, 807 n.3 (3d Cir. 1972) (per curiam). There is little doubt that the
denial of a motion to appoint counsel constitutes a final rejection of the right
asserted. Bradshaw v. Zoological Soc'y, 662 F.2d 1301, 1306 (9th Cir. 1981); Ray v.
Robinson, 640 F.2d 474, 476-77 (3d Cir. 1981); Cotner v. Mason, 657 F.2d 1390,
1391 (10th Cir. 1981) (per curiam).
73. See Bradshaw v. Zoological Soc'y, 662 F.2d 1301, 1321-22 (9th Cir. 1981)
(Wallace, J., dissenting).
74. See id.
75. Bradshaw v. Zoological Soc'y, 662 F.2d 1301, 1307-10 (9th Cir. 1981). When
a district court erroneously denies the motion on the grounds that it lacks the power
to appoint counsel in a civil case, there is no separability problem because the denial
is made without reference to the merits. See Ray v. Robinson, 40 F.2d 474, 476-77
-(3d Cir. 1981); cf. In re Nine Applications for Appointment of Counsel in Title VII
Proceedings, 475 F. Supp. 87, 88-92 (N.D. Ala. 1979) (denial on grounds that counsel
appointed without pay constitutes involuntary servitude), vacated and remanded sub
nom. White v. United States Pipe & Foundry Co., 646 F.2d 203 (5th Cir. 1981).
76. 342 U.S. 1 (1951).
77. Id. at 6. In so doing, the court relied on Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan
Corp., 337 U.S. 541 (1949). Id. at 12 (Jackson, J., concurring). Although review of
bail orders is now covered by 18 U.S.C. § 3147 (1976), Stack's reasoning retains its
vitality.
78. 18 U.S.C. § 3146(b) (1976).
79. Id. The statute also requires the court to consider such other relative factors
as "the accused's family ties, employment, financial resources, character and mental
condition, the length of his residence in the community, his record of convictions,
and his record of appearance at court proceedings or of flight to avoid prosecution or
failure to appear at court proceedings." Id.; see Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1, 8 (1951)
(Jackson, J., concurring) (discussing similar language in former Fed. R. Crim. P.
46(c)).
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Jackson, in a concurring opinion, had no difficulty finding that the
order was "entirely independent of the issues to be tried."' 80 A motion
to appoint counsel is similarly independent because it involves only a
preliminary procedural determination of whether the movant will
proceed with or without counsel. 8' Furthermore, under the circuit
courts' interpretation of the Supreme Court's decision in Roberts v.
United States District Court,8 2 the denial of a motion to proceed in
forma pauperis has generally been deemed within the Cohen doctrine
and, therefore, immediately appealable. 83  The appeal is allowed
even though the appellate court often reviews the entire record to
determine whether the movant's claim has merit. Only when the
claim is not plainly frivolous will he be permitted to proceed in forma
pauperis.84 Motions to appoint counsel demand an identical determi-
80. Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1, 12 (1951) (Jackson, J., concurring). It should be
noted that Justice Jackson was the author of Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp.,
337 U.S. 541 (1949).
81. Bradshaw v. Zoological Soc'y, 662 F.2d 1301, 1308 (9th Cir. 1981). The
movant's claim must be meritorious both in fact and law, Smith v. Fleming Co., 3
Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 568, 569 (W.D. Mo. 1969) (Title VII); see Peterson v.
Nadler, 452 F.2d 754, 757-58 (8th Cir. 1971) (per curiam) (§ 1915(d)), and not
plainly frivolous. Maclin v. Freake, 650 F.2d 885, 887 (7th Cir. 1981) (per curiam) (§
1915(d)); Robinson v. Western Elec., 3 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 846, 847 (7th
Cir. 1971) (Title VII). This determination is limited to a cursory examination of the
record and is not dispositive of the litigation; the issue is whether a colorable claim
exists and not whether it will be successful. Bradshaw v. Zoological Soc'y, 662 F.2d
1301, 1308-09 (9th Cir. 1981) (Title VII); see Knighton v. Watkins, 616 F.2d 795,
799 (5th Cir. 1980) (§ 1915(d)); Peterson v. Nadler, 452 F.2d 754, 757-58 (8th Cir.
1971) (per curiam) (§ 1915(d)). Moreover, the court must keep in mind that pro se
complaints, unlike those of counsel, are "typically inartful," Knighton v. Watkins,
616 F.2d 795, 799 (5th Cir. 1980), and, therefore, should be liberally construed.
Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21 (1972) (per curiam).
82. 339 U.S. 844 (1950) (per curiam).
83. E.g., Sinwell v. Shapp, 536 F.2d 15, 16 (3d Cir. 1976); Flowers v. Turbine
Support Div., 507 F.2d 1242, 1244 (5th Cir. 1975); Kitchens v. Alderman, 376 F.2d
262, 263 (5th Cir. 1967) (per curiam); Smart v. Heinze, 3,17 F.2d 114, 116 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 382 U.S. 896 (1965); Anderson v. Heinze, 258 F.2d 479, 480 n.1 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 889 (1958). But see, e.g., Lamarche v. Sunbeam
Television Corp., 446 F.2d 880, 880 (5th Cir. 1971) (per curiam); Gomez v. United
States, 245 F.2d 346, 347 (5th Cir. 1957); Higgins v. Steele, 195 F.2d 366, 368 (8th
Cir. 1952). The precise holding of Roberts v. United States Dist. Court, 339 U.S. 844
(1940), is unclear. Roberts, a prisoner, sought to proceed as a pauper but the district
court denied the motion on the grounds that he was not a "citizen" for the purposes of
§ 1915. Id. The Court could have limited its holding to such circumstances but,
instead, broadly stated that "[t]he denial . . . of a motion to proceed in forma
pauperis is an appealable order." Id. at 845; see 15 C. Wright & A. Miller, supra note
26, § 3911, at 472-73 & n.16.
84. Bradshaw v. Zoological Soc'y, 662 F.2d 1301, 1308-09 & n.18 (9th Cir.
1981); see 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) (1976). Section 1915, due to its structure, requires an
initial showing of indigency to be granted pauper status. Id. § 1915(a). After pauper
status has been granted, if it appears that the claim is frivolous, or the affidavits
showing poverty are untrue, the court should dismiss the claim. Id. § 1915(d). Most
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nation. 5 Because this determination does not interfere with the trial
court's consideration of the merits, 86 the majority in Bradshaw was
correct in concluding that the denial satisfied the separability require-
ment.
7
B. Effective Review After Final Judgment
The real source of disagreement among the circuits is whether the
denial satisfies the third prong of the collateral order doctrine: the
availability of effective appellate review after final judgment. The
Seventh and Tenth Circuits have categorized the effect of an errone-
courts follow this procedure. E.g., Sinwell v. Shapp, 536 F.2d 15, 18-19 (3d Cir.
1976); Watson v. Ault, 525 F.2d 886, 890-91 (5th Cir. 1976); West v. Procunier, 452
F.2d 645, 646 n.2 (9th Cir. 1971) (per curiam); Forester v. California Adult Auth.,
510 F.2d 58, 60 (8th Cir. 1975). Other courts, however, simultaneously consider the
movant's indigency and the frivolousness of his claim when ruling on the motion.
See, e.g., Wartman v. Branch 7, 510 F.2d 130, 132-34, (7th Cir. 1975); Smart v.
Heinze, 347 F.2d 114, 116 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 896 (1965); Loum v.
Underwood, 262 F.2d 866, 867 (6th Cir. 1959) (per curiam). "Perhaps the best way
to characterize [both procedures'] requirement relating to meritoriousness ... is to
say that the petition must be non-frivolous," Bradshaw v. Zoological Soc'y, 662 F.2d
1301, 1308 n.18 (9th Cir. 1981), and should not be converted into a "preliminary
showing of any particular degree of merit." Ellis v. United States, 356 U.S. 674, 675
(per curiam) (1958).
85. Bradshaw v. Zoological Soc'y, 662 F.2d 1301, 1308-09 & n.18 (9th Cir.
1981). Title VII and § 1915(d) provide a means for indigents to obtain counsel. The
district court is not required to appoint counsel, but is only authorized to do so if, in
the exercise of its discretion, it deems it just. Id. at 1318 & n.43 (Title VII); Ray v.
Robinson, 640 F.2d 474, 477-78 (3d Cir. 1981) (§ 1915(d)). Certain predominant
factors and principles have developed under each statute. The factors considered by a
court in a motion to appoint counsel pursuant to Title VII were first enumerated in
Caston v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 556 F.2d 1305 (5th Cir. 1977), and are the movant's
financial resources, his efforts to secure counsel and the merits of his claim. id. at
1308-10; accord White v. United States Pipe & Foundry Co., 646 F.2d 203, 205 (5th
Cir. 1981); Luna v. International Ass'n of Machinists Local 36, 614 F.2d 529, 531
(5th Cir. 1980); Beckett v. Kent County, 488 F. Supp. 70, 73 (W.D. Mich. 1980). In
addition, some courts consider the public benefit to be derived from the suit. E.g.,
Edmonds v. E.I. duPont deNemours & Co., 315 F. Supp. 523, 525 (D. Kan. 1970);
Petete v. Consolidated Freightways, 313 F. Supp. 1271, 1272 (N.D. Tex. 1970)
(mem.). While no court has established specific guidelines in § 1915(d) cases, the
factors distilled from the case law are similiar to those required in Title VII actions.
E.g., Maclin v. Freake, 650 F.2d 885, 887-89 (7th Cir. 1981) (per curiam); Shields v.
Jackson, 570 F.2d 284, 286 (8th Cir. 1978) (per curiam); Peterson v. Nadler, 452
F.2d 754, 757-58 (8th Cir. 1971) (per curiam). Some courts also consider the possible
benefits accruing to the litigant, the court and the judicial system from the appoint-
ment of counsel. See, e.g., Kennedy v. Meacham, 540 F.2d 1057, 1062 (10th Cir.
1976); Alexander v. Ramsey, 539 F.2d 25, 26 (9th Cir. 1976) (per curiam); Peterson
v. Nadler, 452 F.2d 754, 757-58 (8th Cir. 1971) (per curiam).
86. Bradshaw v. Zoological Soc'y, 662 F.2d 1301, 1308-09 (9th Cir. 1981).
87. See id. at 1310.
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ous denial of a motion to appoint counsel as mere inconvenience. 81
The Third and Ninth Circuits, on the other hand, have recently held
to the contrary"9 and require only the unavailability of meaningful
review in order to justify immediate appeal.90 At the core of this
dispute is the failure of the Seventh and Tenth Circuits to correctly
interpret this element of the collateral order doctrine and its relation-
ship to the recent Supreme Court decision in Firestone Tire & Rubber
Co. v. Risjord.9' These circuits interpret Firestone as allowing imme-
diate appeal only when any other review is impossible.92
Neither finality nor the collateral order doctrine are fixed, invaria-
ble formulas requiring rote application.9 3 The effectiveness of appel-
late review after final judgment should not be determined in a vac-
uum but, rather, should depend upon the type of case,9 4 the
availability of alternative methods of review,95 and the nature and
underlying policies of the particular motion.90
88. See Randle v. Victor Welding Supply Co., 664 F.2d 1064, 1066-67 (7th Cir.
1981) (per curiam); Cotner v. Mason, 657 F.2d 1390, 1391-92 (10th Cir. 1981) (per
curiam).
89. Bradshaw v. Zoological Soc'y, 662 F.2d 1301. 1320 (9th Cir. 1981); Ray v.
Robinson, 640 F.2d 474, 476-77 (3d Cir. 1981).
90. See Bradshaw v. Zoological Soc'y, 662 F.2d 1301, 1310-12, 1314 (9th Cir.
1981); Ray v. Robinson, 640 F.2d 474, 477 (3d Cir. 1981).
91. 449 U.S. 368 (1981).
92. Cotner v. Mason, 657 F.2d 1390, 1392 (10th Cir. 1981) (per curiam). Al-
though the Seventh Circuit did not explicitly rely on this interpretation, it is clear
that it requires a strong showing of harm in order to justify immediate appeal. See
Randle v. Victor Welding Supply Co., 664 F.2d 1064, 1066-67 (7th Cir. 1981) (per
curiam).
93. See Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 471 (1978); Abney v.
United States, 431 U.S. 651, 657, 663 (1977); Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S.
156, 170-71 (1974); Gillespie v. United States Steel Corp., 379 U.S. 148, 152 (1964);
Dickinson v. Petroleum Conver. Corp., 338 U.S. 507, 511 (1950); Bradshaw v.
Zoological Soc'y, 662 F.2d 1301, 1314 n.35 (9th Cir. 1981); United States v. Greger,
657 F.2d 1109, 1112 (9th Cir. 1981), petition for cert..filed, 50 U.S.L.W. 3607 (U.S.
Jan. 19, 1982) (No. 81-1357).
94. Compare Abney v. United States, 431 U.S. 651, 662 (1977) (double jeopardy
claim must be reviewable prior to trial or right is destroyed), with Firestone Tire &
Rubber Co. v. Risjord, 449 U.S. 368, 377-78 (1981) (denial of motion to disqualify
counsel can be effectively reviewed after final judgment).
95. Compare United States v. Ryan, 402 U.S. 530, 533 (1971) (traditional con-
tempt alternative available; exception to finality only where any review impossible),
and Bradshaw v. Zoological Soc'y, 662 F.2d 1301, 1324-25 (9th Cir. 1981) (Wallace,
J., dissenting) (majority ignores availability of mandamus and instead relaxes re-
quirement of effective unreviewability to "possibility of some prejudice"), with
United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 691-92 (1974) (immediate appeal allowed
where traditional contempt alternative unavailable clue to unique circumstances),
and Randle v. Victor Welding Supply Co., 664 F.2d 1064, 1068 (7th Cir. 1981)(Swygert, J., dissenting) (no alternatives available, unlike other cases where "the
Supreme Court has denied immediate review of collateral orders").
96. Compare United States v. MacDonald, 435 U.S. 850, 861-62 (1978) (right to
a speedy trial frustrated if immediate review allowed), with Abney v. United States,
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1. A Distinction between Civil and Criminal Proceedings
In criminal cases, interlocutory review is particularly disfavored
because delay could violate the sixth amendment guarantee of a
speedy trial.7 Therefore, the harm that would result from delaying
review until final judgment should be one which destroys the legal
and practical value of the right asserted.9 8 This requires a strong
showing of harm. The mere act of proceeding to trial must eviscerate
the right and the policies it embodies."9
Harm of this magnitude was present in Stack v. Boyle, 00 in which
denial of a motion to reduce bail threatened not only the right to be
free from confinement prior to conviction, but also the presumption of
innocence.101 Similarly, immediate appeal from the denial of a mo-
tion to dismiss an indictment on double jeopardy grounds was allowed
in Abney v. United States102 because review was necessary to protect
against twice being tried for the same crime. 0 3 The Supreme Court,
in United States v. MacDonald, °4 however, denied immediate review
of an order refusing to dismiss an indictment on speedy trial grounds
alone because the degree of harm could be assessed only after trial.105
Moreover, permitting interlocutory review in such an instance would
frustrate the very right at issue-the right to a speedy trial.'
In civil cases, however, finality is not subject to such a constitu-
tional mandate and, therefore, should be adhered to less strin-
gently. 10 7 Although mere inconvenience remains insufficient to war-
431 U.S. 651., 660-63 (1977) ("special considerations permeating claims of [double
jeopardy] justify a departure from the normal rule of finality").
97. United States v. MacDonald, 435 U.S. 850, 853-54, 861-62 (1978): Will v.
United States, 389 U.S. 90, 96 (1967); DiBella v. United States, 369 U.S. 121, 126-27
(1962); see Abney v. United States, 431 U.S. 651, 657 (1977); United States v. Ryan,
402 U.S. 530, 532-33 (1971).
98. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Risjord, 449 U.S. 368, 376-77 (1981), United
States v. MacDonald, 435 U.S. 850, 860-61 (1978): Abney v. United States, 431 U.S.
651, 660-62 (1977); Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1, 4 (1951); cf. Will v. United States,
389 U.S. 90, 97-98 (1967) (same rule applies to mandamus).
99. United States v. MacDonald, 435 U.S. 850, 860-61 (1978): Abney v. United
States, 431 U.S. 651, 660-62 (1977); see Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1, 4 (1951); cf.
Helstoski v. Meanor, 442 U.S. 500, 507-08 (1979) (challenge to validity of indictment
of a representative on the grounds that it violated the speech and debate clause).
100. 342 U.S. 1 (1951).
101. Id. at 4.
102. 431 U.S. 651 (1977).
103. Id. at 660-62.
104. 435 U.S. 850 (1978).
105. Id. at 860-61.
106. See id. at 861-63.
107. See DiBella v. United States, 369 U.S. 121, 126 (1962); United States v.
Greger, 657 F.2d 1109, 1112 (9th Cir. 1981), petition for cert. filed, 50 U.S.L.W.
3607 (U.S. Jan. 19, 1982) (No. 81-1357); 9 J. Moore, supra note 20, 110.07, at 109-
11.
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rant immediate appeal, the harm required need not approach the
level necessary in the criminal context.' 08 When proceeding to trial
will not completely destroy the right asserted but will, nonetheless,
render meaningful review improbable, interlocutory review should be
granted. 09
If, in Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp.," 0 the Supreme
Court had denied immediate review and the defendant corporation
had eventually prevailed on the merits, the defendant would have
been forced to appeal and then seek a personal judgment against a
potentially insolvent plaintiff."' Similarly, in Swift & Co. Packers v.
Compania Colombiana Del Caribe, S.A.," 2 the possibility that the
ship would later be outside the United States' jurisdiction justified
immediate appeal of an order vacating the attachment of a foreign
vessel." 3 In Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin,114 the Court extended the
collateral order doctrine to an order imposing ninety percent of the
costs of notifying absent class members on the defendant." 5 In the
absence of immediate review, the defendant would have been forced
to bear the costs of notice and after reversal of the order seek restitu-
tion with no assurance of success." 8  Finally, circuit courts have
permitted immediate appeal from the denial of a motion to proceed in
forma pauperis17 because the order will effectively terminate the
litigation if the movant is unable to secure court costs from another
source. "18
108. Compare Abney v. United States, 431 U.S. 651, 660-62 (1977) (mere pro-
ceeding to trial will destroy right asserted in criminal case), with Swift & Co. Packers
v. Compania Colombiana Del Caribe, S.A., 339 U.S. 684, 689 (1950) (appeal after
final judgment may be an "empty rite" in civil litigation). The Supreme Court has
not, however, abandoned the distinction between irreparable harm and inconven-
ience. In Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463 (1978), the Court declined to
extend the collateral order doctrine to an order refusing to certify a class action
because the representatives were free to pursue their respective claims individually
and appeal the denial after the final judgment. See id. at 469.
109. See Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Risjord, 449 U.S. 368, 377-78 (1981);
Swift & Co. Packers v. Compania Colombiana Del Caribe, S.A., 339 U.S. 684, 689
(1950); Ray v. Robinson, 640 F.2d 474, 477 (3d Cir. 1981).
110. 337 U.S. 541 (1949).
111. Collateral Orders, supra note 32, at 750 n.18; see Federal Courts, supra note
20, at 364.
112. 339 U.S. 684 (1950).
113. Id. at 689; see Collateral Orders, supra note 32, at 750.
114. 417 U.S. 156 (1974).
115. Id. at 169-72.
116. 15 C. Wright & A. Miller, supra note 26, § 3911, at 476. Although the
Supreme Court did not address this issue, it is clear that the defendants would not
have been able to recover the costs after final judgment if the plaintiffs were insol-
vent. See id.
117. See supra note 83 and accompanying text.
118. See Bradshaw v. Zoological Soc'y, 662 F.2d 1301, 1308 n.17 (9th Cir. 1981);
Flowers v. Turbine Support Div., 507 F.2d 1242, 1244 (5th Cir. 1975); 9 J. Moore,
supra note 20, 110.10, at 133-34.
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These cases demonstrate that although injury in civil cases may be
less certain than in criminal cases, it is nevertheless sufficiently proba-
ble that review after final judgment would be meaningless."19 In-
deed, the Firestone Court found immediate appeal from an order that
denied a motion to disqualify counsel unwarranted because the oppor-
tunity for "meaningful review" had not been lost. 20  The courts in
Ray and Bradshaw were correct in concluding that because the denial
of a motion to appoint counsel cannot be effectively reviewed after
final judgment, the order shoud be immediately appealable.12 1 Pro-
ceeding without counsel is "inherently prejudicial"'' 2 and, for all
practical purposes, terminates the litigation. 2 3 This harm is more
than sufficient to invoke the collateral order doctrine in a civil case.
In Cotner v. Mason,2 4 the Tenth Circuit grounded its refusal to
permit an immediate appeal from an order denying the appointment
of counsel on Firestone's " 'impossibil[ity of] any review' " lan-
guage. 12 5 This reliance was, however, misplaced. the discussion in
Firestone dealt with interlocutory review in the criminal context.12 6
The quoted language was taken from United States v. Ryan, 2 7 which
involved the appealability of the denial of a motion to quash a sub-
poena duces tecum in a tax evasion prosecution.12s
Although Firestone was a civil case, 2 its reliance on Ryan was not
entirely inappropriate. Both cases involved the same type of harm: the
disclosure of privileged material. 130 In Ryan, such harm would have
resulted from the denial of a motion to quash the subpoena,' 3' while
119. See Swift & Co. Packers v. Compania Colombiana Del Caribe, S.A., 339
U.S. 684, 689 (1950); Collateral Orders, supra note 32, at 750 & n.18.
120. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Risjord, 449 U.S. 368, 377-78 (1981).
121. Bradshaw v. Zoological Soc'y, 662 F.2d 1301, 1314 (9th Cir. 1981); see Ray
v. Robinson, 640 F.2d 474, 477 (3d Cir. 1981).
122. Bradshaw v. Zoological Soc'y, 662 F.2d 1301, 1312 (9th Cir. 1981); cf. Ray
v. Robinson, 640 F.2d 474, 477 (3d Cir. 1981) (appointment of counsel must occur
before trial to be of any practical value).
123. See Bradshaw v. Zoological Soc'y, 662 F.2d 1301, 1310-14 (9th Cir. 1981).
124. 657 F.2d 1390 (10th Cir. 1981) (per curiam).
125. Id. at 1392 (emphasis deleted)(quoting Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v.
Risjord, 449 U.S. 368, 376 (1981).
126. 449 U.S. at 376-77.
127. 402 U.S. 530, 533 (1971).
128. In re Ryan, 430 F.2d 658, 659 (9th Cir. 1970) (per curiam), rev'd sub nom.
United States v. Ryan, 402 U.S. 530 (1971).
129. 449 U.S. at 369.
130. See id. at 376, 378; United States v. Ryan, 402 U.S. 530, 532 n.3 (1971);
Armstrong v. McAlpin, 625 F.2d 433, 438 (2d Cir. 1980) (en banc), vacated and
remanded with instructions to dismiss appeal, 449 U.S. 1106 (1981); Appealability,
supra note 20, at 456-58 & n.35.
131. 402 U.S. at 530-33; accord Appealability, supra note 20, at 457-58.
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in Firestone it would have followed from the denial of a motion to
disqualify counsel on conflict of interest grounds.' 32
The harm that will result from the lack of immediate review of a
denial of a motion to appoint counsel is however, different in kind and
far more severe than the harm that flows from the non-appealability
of an order refusing to disqualify counsel. In the former, because the
pro se litigant is effectively incapable of pursuing his claim, or avoid-
ing prejudicial error, the litigation is, for all practical purposes, termi-
nated.133 The latter, however, results at most in a tainted proceed-
ing. 134 Cotner's suggestion that Firestone established a more stringent
and universal standard135 is, therefore, unjustified.
2. Availability of Alternative Methods of Review
The Seventh and Tenth Circuits' reliance on Firestone, and their
consequent implicit dependence on Ryan, is also misplaced because in
those cases alternate methods of review were available. In Ryan,
immediate review of the subpoena duces tecum was available if the
subpoenaed party submitted himself to contempt and appealed the
contempt decree.' 36  Similarly, the Firestone Court explicitly noted
that a number of alternatives, including a protective order, were
available to the movant.137 The possibility of adequate alternatives
heightened each court's reluctance to permit interlocutory review.1 38
132. 449 U.S. at 370-71 & n.6, 376; accord Appealability, supra note 20, at 456-
57. The only harm that could possibly accrue from the erroneous denial is the
disclosure of confidential information by counsel in a position of confidence. Id. But
see Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Decker, 423 F.2d 487, 492 (7th Cir. 1970) (per
curiam), aff'd mem. by an equally divided Court, 400 U.S. 348 (1971).
133. See Bradshaw v. Zoological Soc'y, 662 F.2d 1301, 1310-12 (9th Cir. 1981);
Randle v. Victor Welding Supply Co., 664 F.2d 1064, 1068 (7th Cir. 1981) (Swygert,
J., dissenting); Caston v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 556 F.2d 1305, 1308-09 (5th Cir.
1977).
134. See Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Risjord, 449 U.S. 368, 376, 378 (1981);
Armstrong v. McAlpin, 625 F.2d 433, 438 (2d Cir. 1980) (en banc), vacated and
remanded with instructions to dismiss appeal, 449 U.S. 1106 (1981); Appealability,
supra note 20, at 456-58 & n.35. But see Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Decker,
423 F.2d 487, 492 (7th Cir. 1970) (per curiam), aJJ'd mem. by an equally divided
Court, 400 U.S. 348 (1971).
135. See Cotner v. Mason, 657 F.2d 1390, 1392 (10th Cir. 1981) (per curiam);
accord Randle v. Victor Welding Supply Co., 664 F.2d 1064, 1066 (7th Cir. 1981)
(per curiam).
136. United States v. Ryan, 402 U.S. 530, 532 (1971); accord Cobbledick v.
United States, 309 U.S. 323, 328 (1940); Alexander v. United States, 201 U.S. 117,
121 (1906); Collateral Orders, supra note 32, at 751 n.21.
137. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Risjord, 449 U.S. 368, 378 n.13 (1981).
138. See 449 U.S. at 378 n.13; accord United States v. Ryan, 402 U.S. 530, 532-34
(1971).
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In Bradshaw, the dissent suggested that the writ of mandamus
could serve as an adequate alternate remedy. 3 Issuance of manda-
mus, however, is discretionary 40 and limited to 'exceptional circum-
stances amounting to a judicial 'usurpation of power' "141 by the
district court. 142 This rigid and narrow standard" 3 for invoking man-
damus viii rarely aid the pro se litigant. An order refusing to appoint
counsel generally does not involve a judicial usurpation of power."14
Moreover, the importance of the right asserted and the consequence of
delaying review necessitate mandatory rather than discretionary
methods of review.145 The refusal to immediately review a denial of a
motion to appoint counsel, unlike the situations which existed in
Firestone and Ryan, leaves an indigent with no viable alternative.
139. Bradshaw v. Zoological Soc'y, 662 F.2d 1301, 1324 (9th Cir. 1981) (Wallace,
J., dissenting). In its search for effective alternatives to immediate review under the
collateral order doctrine, a court might consider the Interlocutory Appeals Act. 28
U.S.C. § 1292(b) (1976). This, however, is not a viable option. In order to invoke the
Act, the district court must certify that the order satisfies specified standards. See id.
This certification requirement has provided district courts with a means of limiting
reversals of their orders and has thereby reduced the Act's effectiveness. Redish,
supra note 3, at 108-09. In addition, the appellate courts are given unfettered
discretion to reject a certified application for appeal without providing any reasons.
S. Rep. No. 2434, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 3, reprinted in 1958 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad.
News 5255, 5257. Moreover, it is highly unlikely that a denial of a motion to appoint
counsel will be a controlling question of law as required by the Act. See 28 U.S.C. §
1292(b) (1976). Rather, the denial involves a question of judgment, see supra notes
76-81, 85 and accompanying text; the Act cannot be invoked merely "'to test the
propriety of a district judge's exercise of discretion." Katz v. Carte Blanche Corp.,
496 F.2d 747, 765 (3d Cir.) (Seitz, C.J., dissenting), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 885
(1974); accord Garner v. Wolfinbarger, 433 F.2d 117, 120 (5th Cir. 1970): United
States v. Salter, 421 F.2d 1393, 1394 (1st Cir. 1970).
140. Kerr v. United States Dist. Court, 426 U.S. 394, 403 (1976); see 28 U.S.C. §
1651(a) (1976); 9 J. Moore, supra note 20, 110.26, at 283-84: Redish, supra note 3,
at 114-15; Appealability, supra note 20, at 472-73.
141. Will v. United States, 389 U.S. 90, 95 (1967) (quoting DeBeers Consol.
Mines, Ltd. v. United States, 325 U.S. 212, 217 (1945)): accord Kerr v. United States
Dist. Court, 426 U.S. 394, 402 (1976).
142. Will v. United States, 389 U.S. 90, 95 (1967); accord 9 J. Moore, supra note
20, 110.01, at 50-51; Redish, supra note 3, at 115.
143. See Helstoski v. Meanor, 442 U.S. 500, 505-06 (1979); Kerr v. United States
Dist. Court, 426 U.S. 394, 402-03 (1976).
144. Compare La Buy v. Howes Leather Co., 352 U.S. 249, 255-60 (1957) (writ
issued because of persistent disregard for the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure), and
United States v. United States Dist. Court, 334 U.S. 258, 262-65 (1948) (writ neces-
sary to confine district court to terms of appellate court's mandate), with Kerr v.
United States Dist. Court, 426 U.S. 394, 395-96, 404-06 (1976) (refusal of appellate
court to issue writ compelling district court to vacate two discovery orders held
proper), and Will v. United States, 389 U.S. 90, 91, 107 (1967) (writ to compel
district court to vacate a portion of pre-trial order in a criminal case held improperly
issued).
145. See Bradshaw v. Zoological Soc'y, 662 F.2d 1301, 1316-17 (9th Cir. 1981).
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3. Nature of the Order
An additional reason for enforcing the ban on interlocutory appeals
is the potential for abuse and harassment that some motions and their
immediate review afford. 46 Not only is a motion to disqualify coun-
sel often used improperly1 47 but it is also an especially obstructive
litigation device because it can separate a party from his chosen
counsel.148 Thus, the opportunity for immediate review of the mo-
tion's denial would merely compound the likelihood of abuse and
needless delay. 49 Although the Firestone Court did not explicitly rely
on the potential for misuse of a disqualification motion in denying
review, circuit courts have done so.' 50
In contrast, a motion to appoint counsel has little potential as a
device for harassment and delay.' 5' Rather, the presence of counsel,
by placing the indigent on equal footing with his adversary, 152 will
facilitate the speedy resolution of the litigation. 5 3 Section 1915(d)
and, to a greater extent, Title VII are designed to reduce the inequities
present when an indigent seeks to redress a violation of his rights."14
As a practical matter, however, this intent is thwarted when a motion
146. E.g., In re Continental Inv. Corp., 637 F.2d 1, 6 (1st Cir. 1980); Armstrong
v. McAlpin, 625 F.2d 433, 437-38 (2d Cir. 1980) (en banc), vacated and remanded
with instructions to dismiss appeal, 449 U.S. 1106 (1981); Appealability, supra note
20, at 450.
147. See, e.g., In re Continental Inv. Corp., 637 F.2d 1, 6 (1st Cir. 1980);
Armstrong v. McAlpin, 625 F.2d 433, 437-38 (2d Cir. 1980) (en banc), vacated and
remanded with instructions to dismiss appeal, 449 U.S. 1106 (1981); see also Appeal-
ability, supra note 20, at 450-51 (potential for abuse with such motions).
148. Appealability, supra note 20, at 450.
149. See sources cited supra note 147.
150. See, e.g., In re Continental Inv. Corp., 637 F.2d 1, 6 (1st Cir. 1980);
Armstrong v. McAlpin, 625 F.2d 433, 437-38 (2d Cir. 1980) (en banc), vacated and
remanded with instructions to dismiss appeal, 449 U.S. 1106 (1981); Melamed v. ITT
Continental Baking Co., 592 F.2d 290, 295 (6th Cir. 1979). Although the Supreme
Court permitted the immediate appeal of the denial of a motion to dismiss an
indictment on double jeopardy grounds in Abney v. United States, 431 U.S. 651, 662
(1977), it recognized the possibility of dilatory appeals. Id. at 662 n.8. The Court,
however, did not deem this possibility sufficient grounds to deny the appeal. See id.
The Court probably reached this conclusion because proceeding to trial after an
erroneous denial would totally destroy the right asserted. See id. at 660-62.
151. Bradshaw v. Zoological Soc'y, 662 F.2d 1301, 1315 (9th Cir. 1981).
152. See supra notes 11-16 and accompanying text.
153. Bradshaw v. Zoological Soc'y, 662 F.2d 1301, 1315-16 (9th Cir. 1981);
Knighton v. Watkins, 616 F.2d 795, 799 (5th Cir. 1980); see Gordon v. Leeke, 574
F.2d 1147, 1154-55 (4th Cir.) (Hall, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 970
(1978).
154. Bradshaw v. Zoological Soc'y, 662 F.2d 1301, 1316-17 & n.40 (9th Cir. 1981)
(Title VII); Hilliard v. Volcker, 659 F.2d 1125, 1128 & n.24 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (Title
VII); H.R. Rep. No. 238, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 12, reprinted in 1972 U.S. Code Cong.
& Ad. News 2137, 2148 (Title VII); H.R. Rep. No. 1079, 52d Cong., 1st Sess. 1-2
(1892) (predecessor of § 1915); Duniway, supra note 11, at 1271-72, 1276-77 (§ 1915
and its predecessor).
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to appoint counsel is erroneously denied and immediate and certain
review is unavailable. s5 Even if this motion and its subsequent
appeal might be taken for improper and dilatory purposes, the conse-
quences of an erroneous denial are more than sufficient to justify
immediate review.156
Analogous judicial precedent buttresses this conclusion. An order
denying pauper status is immediately appealable'5 because it de-
prives the movant of his right of access to the courts.ss This is
equally true when the erroneous denial of a motion to appoint counsel
is deemed non-appealable. In the first case, denial of immediate
review results in an actual bar,5 9 while in the second, a de facto
barrier is created.160 As the Bradshaw court noted,
[b]ecause the likelihood that an [indigent] will be unable to pro-
ceed through trial and obtain effective review of the order is so
high, and the prejudice inherent in proceeding to trial without
counsel is so great, we do not view the injury that would inevitably
result from a refusal to review the order before us as speculative or
hypothetical.' 6
The court therefore concluded that "'it is not difficult to imagine-
indeed, it is impossible to ignore-the irreparable injury that would
result from a refusal to review [immediately] an order denying [an
indigent] appointed counsel." 6 2
155. See Bradshaw v. Zoological Soc'y, 662 F.2d 1301, 1310-14 (9th Cir. 1981):
Randle v. Victor Welding Supply Co., 664 F.2d 1064, 1068 (7th Cir. 1981) (Swygert,
J., dissenting); Ray v. Robinson, 640 F.2d 474, 477 (3d Cir. 1981); Caston v. Sears,
Roebuck & Co., 556 F.2d 1305, 1308-09 (5th Cir. 1977); Miller v. Pleasure, 296 F.2d
283, 284 (2d Cir. 1961) (per curiam), cert. denied, 370 U.S. 964 (1962).
156. Bradshaw v. Zoological Soc'y, 662 F.2d 1301, 1315-18 (9th Cir. 1981); see
supra notes 13-16, 122-23, 133 and accompanying text. The motion requires the
speediest resolution possible if the relief sought is to be of any value. See Ray v.
Robinson, 640 F.2d 474, 477 (3d Cir. 1981). Title VII's legislative history is replete
with evidence of congressional recognition of the speed necessary to effect the Act's
policies. See, e.g., 118 Cong. Rec. 942 (1972) (statement of Sen. Williams); id.
(statement of Sen. Dominick); id. at 942-43 (statement of Sen. Javits); id. at 94344
(statement of Sen. Talmadge).
157. See supra note 83 and accompanying text.
158. See supra notes 11, 118 and accompanying text.
159. See supra note 118 and accompanying text.
160. See supra notes 13-16, 122-23, 133 and accompanying text. An order grant-
ing a motion to disqualify counsel has also been found to be immediately appealable
because it "may effectively terminate the litigation if the [movant] cannot afford to
hire new counsel." Armstrong v. McAlpin, 625 F.2d 433, 441 (2d Cir. 1980) (en
banc) (dictum), vacated and remanded with instructions to dismiss appeal, 449 U.S.
1106, (1981). But cf. United States v. Greger, 657 F.2d 1109, 1113 (9th Cir. 1981)
(criminal case, therefore counsel appointed if indigent), petition for cert. filed, 50
U.S.L.W. 3607 (U.S. Jan. 19, 1982) (No. 81-1357). An indigent, almost by defini-
tion, will find his litigation terminated when he cannot immediately appeal the
erroneous denial of a motion to appoint counsel.
161. Bradshaw v. Zoological Soc'y, 662 F.2d 1301, 1312 (9th Cir. 1981).
162. Id.
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CONCLUSION
The final judgment rule and the collateral order doctrine are fluid
concepts that embody often conflicting but important considerations:
the concern for judicial economy and the desire to avoid injustice. The
emphasis given to each policy in a particular setting will necessarily
depend upon the character of the case, the availability of alternatives
and the nature of the order. The application of this analysis to a
motion to appoint counsel pursuant to section 1915(d) or Title VII
conclusively demonstrates that the order falls squarely within the
parameters of the collateral order doctrine.
Nicolas Swerdlof-
